iOS Forensics: Overcoming iPhone Data Protection

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Agenda

- iOS Forensics 101
- iOS 4 Data Protection
- iOS Forensics
  - Passcode
  - Keychain
  - Storage

Forensics 101

Acquisition ➜ Analysis ➜ Reporting

GOALS:

1. Assuming physical access to the device extract as much information as practical

2. Leave as little traces/artifacts as practical

iOS Forensics 101

- Passcode
  - Prevents unauthorized access to the device
  - Bypassing passcode is usually enough
- Keychain
  - System-wide storage for sensitive data
  - Encrypted
- Storage encryption
  - iPhone 3Gs and later can encrypt disk data

iOS Forensics 101

- iOS is modified version of Mac OS X
  - Familiar environment
- iOS enforces additional security
  - Code signing: can't run unsigned executables
  - Sandboxing: access to system is limited
- Acquisition options:
  - Via exposed interfaces (i.e. Sync, Backup)
  - Via circumventing security and running own code

iOS Forensics 101

- Logical: iOS Backup
  - Ask device to produce a backup
  - Device must be unlocked
  - Device may produce encrypted backup
  - Limited amount of information
- Physical: filesystem acquisition
  - Boot-time exploit to run unsigned code
  - Device lock state isn't relevant
  - Can get all information from the device
  - Since iOS 4 filesystem is encrypted

Pre-iOS 4 Forensics

- Device passcode can be bypassed
- Storage is effectively not encrypted
  - Device transparently decrypts data
- Keychain data is encrypted
  - One can either decrypt all or nothing. Usually all.

Once you have code execution, rest is easy

New in iOS 4

- Passcode protection is much more robust
- Storage is encrypted
  - Metadata is not encrypted
  - Contents of (almost) every file is encrypted
- New (and better) Keychain encryption
- New (and better) iTunes backup format

All these are part of iOS 4 Data Protection

AES Keys

- All iOS devices have built-in AES processor with 2 hardcoded keys:
  - GID Key is shared by all devices of the same kind
  - UID Key is unique to each and every device (hardware key)
- More keys are computed during startup:
  - Key 0x835 = AES_encrypt (UID, 0101..01) (device key)
  - Derived keys depend solely on GID or UID and thus are fixed for the particular device

Protection Classes

- Content is grouped into protection classes:
  - Available only when device is unlocked
  - Available after first device unlock (and until off)
  - Always available
- Each protection class assigned a master encryption key
- Master keys are protected by device key and passcode
- Protected master keys form system keybag
  - New keys created during device restore

System Keybag

- Stores protected (encrypted) master keys
- Keybag payload is encrypted before writing to disk
- Stored in /private/var/keybags/systembag.kb
- File has NSProtectionNone protection class
  - Meaning it is encrypted
- 11 protection classes in total
  - All but NSProtectionNone are stored in systembag.kb
  - NSProtectionNone is stored in Effaceable Storage

Effaceable Storage

- Region of flash memory
- Facilitates storage of small amounts of data with ability to quickly erase them
- Items within effaceable storage are called lockers
- As of iOS 4: 960 bytes capacity, 3 lockers:
  - ‘BAG1’ – systembag.kb payload key and IV
  - ‘Dkey’ – NSProtectionNone class master key
  - ‘EMF!’ – Filesystem encryption key

Unlocking Keybag



Escrow Keybag

- "Usability feature"
  - Allows iTunes to unlock the device
- Contains same master keys as system keybag
- Created when device (unlocked) is connected to the iTunes for the first time
- Stored on the computer side
- Protected by 256 bit random "passcode"
  - "Passcode" is stored on the device
- Escrow keybag gives same powers as knowing the passcode

iOS 4 Key Hierarchy



iOS 4 Key Hierarchy



iOS 4 Key Hierarchy



iOS 4 Key Hierarchy



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

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

iOS 4 Key Hierarchy



Pre-iOS 4 Passcode

- Lockscreen (i.e. UI) is the only protection
- Passcode is stored in the keychain
  - Passcode itself, not its hash
- Can be recovered or removed instantly
  - Remove record from the keychain
  - And/or remove setting telling UI to ask for the passcode

iOS 4 Passcode

- Passcode is used to compute passcode key
  - Computation tied to hardware key
  - Same passcode will yield different passcode keys on different devices!
- Passcode key required to unlock all but 3 master keys in system keybag
  - Most files are NSProtectionNone thus don't need passcode
  - Most keychain items are accessible WhenUnlocked or AfterFirstUnlock thus DO require passcode

iOS 4 Passcode

- Passcode-to-Key transformation is slow
- Offline bruteforce currently not possible
  - Requires extracting hardware key
- On-device bruteforce is slow
  - 2 p/s on iPhone 3G, 7 p/s on iPad
- System keybag contains hint on password complexity

iOS 4 Passcode

- 0 – digits only, length = 4 (simple passcode)



iOS 4 Passcode

- 0 – digits only, length = 4 (simple passcode)
- 1 – digits only, length != 4



iOS 4 Passcode

- 0 – digits only, length = 4 (simple passcode)
- 1 – digits only, length != 4
- 2 – contains non-digits, any length



iOS 4 Passcode

- 0 – digits only, length = 4 (simple passcode)
- 1 – digits only, length != 4
- 2 – contains non-digits, any length

Can at least identify weak passcodes



Demo

Pre-iOS 4 Keychain

- SQLite3 Database, only passwords are encrypted
- All items are encrypted with the device key (0x835) and random IV
- Key is unique for each device and is fixed for lifetime of the device
- Key can be extracted (computed) for offline use
- All past and future keychain items from the device can be decrypted using that key



iOS 4 Keychain

- SQLite3 Database, only passwords are encrypted
- Available protection classes:
  - kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked (+ ...ThisDeviceOnly)
  - kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock (+ ...ThisDeviceOnly)
  - kSecAttrAccessibleAlways (+ ...ThisDeviceOnly)
- Random key for each item
- Item key is protected with corresponding protection class master key

Pre-iOS 4 Storage

- No encryption before iPhone 3GS
- Starting with iPhone 3GS:
  - Encryption uses EMF key for everything
  - Provides fast wipe, not confidentiality
  - Transparent to applications
  - Filesystem acquisition is not affected

iOS 4 Storage

- Available protection classes:
  - NSProtectionNone
  - NSProtectionComplete
- If no protection class is specified, EMF key is used
  - Filesystem metadata and unprotected files
  - Transparent encryption and decryption (same as pre-iOS 4)
- If protection class is specified, per-file random key is used
  - Key protected with master key is stored com.apple.system.cprotect extended attribute

iOS 4 Storage

- Acquired raw image has everything decrypted with EMF key
  - Filesystem metadata is OK
  - File contents are not

- Restoring file data requires reverse transformations:
  - Encrypt with EMF key to get correct ciphertext
  - Decrypt with file key to get plaintext

iOS 4 Forensics



iOS 4 Forensics

- Acquiring disk image is not enough for iOS 4+
  - Content protection keys must also be extracted from the device during acquisition
  - Effaceable Storage contents are also needed to decrypt dd images.
- Passcode or escrow keybag is needed for a complete set of master keys
- In real world it might be a good idea to extract source data and compute protection keys offline

Conclusion

- iPhone physical analysis is possible again
- Physical acquisition requires boot-time exploit
- Passcode is *usually* not a problem
- Both proprietary and open-source tools for iOS 4 forensics available

Questions?

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